1st Edition

Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology




ISBN 9780367343200
Published January 16, 2020 by Routledge
270 Pages

USD $155.00

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Book Description

This book offers a systematic look at current challenges in moral epistemology through the lens of research on higher-order evidence. Fueled by recent advances in empirical research, higher-order evidence has generated a wealth of insights about the genealogy of moral beliefs. Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology explores how these insights have an impact on the epistemic status of moral beliefs.

The essays are divided into four thematic sections. Part I addresses higher-order evidence against morality that comes from sources such as disagreement and moral psychology. Part II covers rebuttals of higher-order evidence against morality. The essays in Part III examine the relevance of higher-order evidence for a broader range of phenomena in moral epistemology, for both individuals and groups, including moral testimony and phenomena of practical concern, such as fundamentalist views about moral matters. Finally, Part IV discusses permissible epistemic attitudes regarding a body of moral evidence, including the question of how to determine the permissibility of such attitudes.

This volume is the first to explicitly address the implications of higher-order evidence in moral epistemology. It will be of interest to researchers and advanced graduate students working in epistemology and metaethics.

Table of Contents

Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology

Michael Klenk

Part I: Higher-Order Evidence against Morality

1. Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat and All the Evidence

Silvan Wittwer

2. Moral Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking

Norbert Paulo

3. Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology

Paul Silva

4. Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence

Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman

Part II: Rebutting Higher-Order Evidence against Morality

5. Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology

Brian C. Barnett

6. Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence

Marco Tiozzo

7. Debunking Scepticism

Michael Huemer

Part III: Broader Implications of Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology

8. Moral Testimony as Higher-Order Evidence

Marcus Lee, Neil Sinclair, & Jon Robson

9. Higher-Order Defeat in Collective Moral Epistemology

J. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini

10. The Fragile Epistemology of Fanaticism

Joshua DiPaolo

Part IV: Permissible Epistemic Attitudes in Response to Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology

11. How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement

Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson

12. Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology

Justin Clarke-Doane

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Editor(s)

Biography

Michael Klenk works at the intersection of metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. His published papers on these topics in Synthese, Ratio, the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, and the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, among others. He works at Delft University of Technology and held visiting positions at St. Gallen and Stanford University.

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